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1. Introduction
Redistribution is one of the primary objectives of the modern welfare state. Consequently, it is
no surprise that all OECD countries spend large amounts of resources on redistribution (OECD,
2008). Redistributive interventions by the state are usually justified on the grounds that they
provide income maintenance or insurance in the case of adverse shocks or that they redistribute
income across the lifecycle (Barr, 1992). However, redistributive interventions may also aim
at redistributing from rich to poor with the explicit goal of reducing existing inequalities.
Especially for the latter reason, individuals’ voting behavior and their preferences with respect
to redistribution are usually thought to determine the overall amount of redistribution and
the reduction of existing inequalities (Borck, 2007).1 Reflecting this key conceptual issue,
this paper presents new empirical evidence on the hypothesized link between preferences with
respect to redistribution and political outcomes, studying the empirical association between
individuals’ normative assessment of market justice on the one hand and their general support
for redistribution by the state as well as their preferences over different political parties on the
other.
A series of empirical studies focuses on individuals’ preferences over redistribution and the
underlying determinants of the demand for redistribution. For example, Fong (2001) uses
survey data from the U.S. to model support for redistribution as a function of individuals’
subjective beliefs about the determinants of pay. She finds that individuals’ beliefs about
the determinants of pay have large and significant effects on the demand for redistribution,
even after controlling for variables describing self-interested motives for redistribution, the
most important of which are captured by an individual’s level of personal income. Even
though personal income does explain some of the variation in support for redistribution, it is a
surprisingly poor predictor on its own, given its prominent role within the economic literature
(e.g. Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Roberts, 1977).2 Similarly, Corneo and Gru¨ner (2002) find
that selfish motives drive the support for redistribution, but not exclusively so. People appear
1Several researchers have argued that observed cross-country differences in the actual amount of redistribution
are presumably linked to corresponding differences in perceptions and beliefs (e.g. Alesina and Angeletos, 2005;
Be´nabou and Tirole, 2006). Empirical studies have primarily focused on the simple contrast between Europe
and the U.S. (e.g. Alesina and Glaeser, 2004), the large heterogeneity in perceptions and beliefs among European
countries notwithstanding (Osberg and Smeeding, 2006).
2Harms and Zink (2003) review different mechanisms that may explain the limited influence of individual
income on redistributive preferences.
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to share a common belief in distributive justice, and they find that individuals’ attitudes
toward, and their perceptions of, distributive issues are at least as relevant as personal income
in shaping preferences for redistribution. Similar results on the importance of ideological factors
are presented in Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) as well as in Bernasconi (2006), who studies
people’s satisfaction with the tax system instead of general redistributive preferences. Another
important explanation of differences in preferences over redistribution stresses the role of past
and expected future social mobility, as argued by Piketty (1995) and Be´nabou and Ok (2001).
A recent study by Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2009) underlines the important role individual
experiences of economic hardship play in shaping individuals’ normative beliefs. Moreover,
all these studies also show differences in preferences over redistribution across various socio-
demographic characteristics like education, ethnicity, and gender.3
This study adds to the existing literature on the determinants of preferences with respect
to redistribution on two distinct dimensions. First, I introduce the conceptual and empirical
distinction between individuals’ perceptions of actual wages paid for different occupations and
their normative assessment of ethical wages. Up until now, most empirical studies have either
focused on measures that do not allow differentiating between these two distinct dimensions
or on social welfare functions to incorporate normative judgments into the measurement of
inequality (e.g. Bojer, 2003; Lambert, 2001).4 However, these two dimensions are both con-
ceptually and cognitively distinct, and may thus differ substantially from each other for any
given individual.5 Clearly, the fact that someone perceives a high level of inequality with re-
spect to the actual distribution of wages does not necessarily imply that this individual thinks
that the distribution is unfair or unethical. On the contrary, it is easily conceivable that people
perceive an effectively unequal distribution of wages as just if, for example, they think that
3There are additional factors that presumably play a key role in explaining cross-country differences. For
example, Alesina and Giuliano (2009) specifically emphasize the role of cultural and historical factors. Potential
feedback from political and economic institutions on preferences over redistribution is the main focus of Alesina
and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln (2007), who study the effect of the German reunification on individuals’ attitudes towards
state intervention.
4Amiel et al. (1999) present an empirical assessment of different welfare functions based on survey data that
are used to retrieve information about individuals’ inequality aversion.
5The presumption that the conceptual distinction between individuals’ perceptions and normative valuations
may be important is not new, however. Similar arguments and proposals for measuring distributive justice as
the discrepancy between perceived and expected rewards have been made by Alwin (1987), Jasso (1980, 1999),
Shepelak and Alwin (1986), and Younts and Mueller (2001), among others. Osberg and Smeeding (2006) use
a conceptual and empirical framework similar to the one proposed here, but they neither explore the potential
determinants of differences in their subjective measures of inequality nor do they look at the potential link
between those measures and others more closely associated with factual political outcomes.
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differences in education are responsible for the differences in wages and if they view pay dif-
ferentials based on education as justified. Moreover, it has been pointed out that individuals’
perceptions may themselves be severely tilted (e.g. Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Be´nabou and
Tirole, 2006). The potential discrepancy between actual and ethical wage estimates also leads
to a natural conceptualization of individuals’ normative assessment of market justice simply
as the discrepancy between actual and ethical distribution. Indeed, Sen (2000, p.60) made the
same point, arguing that “people’s attitudes towards, or reactions to, actual income distribu-
tions can be significantly influenced by the correspondence - or lack thereof - between (1) their
ideas of what is normatively tolerable, and (2) what they actually see in the society around
them”. The second key feature of this paper is that I not only study different determinants
of these new measures of subjective inequality, but also the association between these new
measures and more general political preferences such as individuals’ support for redistribution
by the state. While there is quite some evidence on different determinants of individual pref-
erences over redistribution, much less emphasis has been placed up until now on the empirical
association between individuals’ preferences over redistribution and their more general political
preferences, at least among studies working with individual-level data.6
The empirical analysis is based on Swiss survey data from the International Social Survey
Program. The focus on Switzerland in the empirical analysis is mainly driven by the belief that
Swiss direct democratic institutions, the most important of which is arguably the possibility
of budget referenda (Feld and Matsusaka, 2003), and the Swiss multi-party system make it
ideally suited for studying the relation between individuals’ assessment of market justice and
their support for governmental intervention, as well as their stated preferences over different
political parties. In this respect, both Frey (1994) and Feld and Kirchga¨ssner (2000) argue
that citizens in countries with direct legislation are not only better informed about political
issues than citizens in representative democracies, but that they can also use direct legislation
to control and sanction their political representatives. This suggests a closer link between
individuals’ preferences and political outcomes in countries where direct legislation is in place.
Moreover, Swiss citizens are not only asked to vote on many referenda and initiatives each
year, some of which may involve issues that directly touch on redistributive issues, they are
6The situation is somewhat different with studies focusing on cross-country differences in preferences over
redistribution, in which case political variables actually play a prominent role; see Alesina and Glaeser (2004),
inter alia.
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also regularly involved in elections. In contrast to many other countries, there are several
political parties in Switzerland with substantial vote shares and moreover, these parties differ
quite strongly in a general sense, but also in their specific position towards redistributive policy
(e.g. Hug and Schulz, 2007). Based on these arguments, I expect a much closer association
between individuals’ subjective perceptions of and normative valuations of inequality and their
preferences over redistribution by the state as well as their preferences over different political
parties in Switzerland than in most other countries.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the data source
and discusses the key variables. Subjective inequality measures are presented in section 3,
along with corresponding descriptive statistics. The main empirical analysis is presented and
discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2. Data
I use data from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), a collaboration of national
survey organizations, presently representing 45 different countries. The ISSP focuses on varying
thematic topics and administers a survey each year on main themes such as the environment,
religion, the role of government, or social inequality (more information is available on the
organization’s website, www.issp.org).
The ISSP administered its first survey focusing on issues around the main theme of social
inequality in 1987. Two more surveys on the topic followed in 1992 and 1999, and a fourth sur-
vey was administered in 2009.7 I only use the data from 1999 in this paper because Switzerland
did not take part in the 1992 survey and because there were several changes in many of the
key variables between the first and the third survey. The survey provides data on individuals’
perceptions of the income distribution and the factors determining individual incomes, issues
of distributive justice, and the role of the government regarding the distribution of earnings.8
The data are almost perfectly suited for the analysis of subjective inequality and the assess-
ment of market justice because they contain an interesting and fascinating series of individuals’
7The data from the 2009 survey would be interesting to study, as it was conducted in the midst of the global
financial crisis, but they will presumably not be available before 2011.
8Stamm et al. (2003) provide details regarding the collection of the data and an extensive descriptive discus-
sion of the data. The data can be obtained from the Swiss Information and Data Archive Service for the Social
Sciences (SIDOS).
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subjective estimates of wages paid for in different occupations.
2.1. Individual estimates of actual and ethical wages
More specifically, individuals were asked to estimate actual wages of people working in dif-
ferent occupations.9 They were also asked to state what they believed to be a fair wage for
people working in these occupations. In both cases, all estimates implicitly refer to full-time
employment, and individuals gave estimates of net monthly wages (i.e. wages net of social
security contributions, but before taxes and transfers) in Swiss francs (CHF).10 Below, I will
simply refer to actual and ethical wages, respectively.11
Figure 1
Figure 1 plots individuals’ average wage estimates by occupation: the hollow triangles show
average actual wage estimates and the hollow circles show average ethical wage estimates for
ten different occupations (see also table A.1 in the appendix). Figure 1 for example shows that
people think that an unskilled worker in a factory actually earns about 3,100 CHF per month.
At the same time they believe that such a worker rather ought to be paid about 3,900 CHF, or
almost 800 CHF more than the perceived wage (or about 125% of the actual wage estimate).
Similarly, the average estimate of the actual wage of a lawyer amounts to about 18,000 CHF,
while the average estimate of his ethical wage corresponds to about 13,000 CHF only (about
72% of its actual estimate).
Moreover, figure 1 shows that there is a clear and unique ranking of the different occupations
with respect to the average estimate of their actual monthly wages, from a low of about 3,000
CHF (shop assistant) to a high of more than 32,000 CHF (owner-manager of a large national
9The full list of occupations and the exact wording of the questions is given in appendix A. See also the study
by Kelley and Evans (1993) for an interesting international comparison of these occupational wage estimates
using data from an earlier survey of the ISSP.
10As I will detail below, the demand for equalization of market wages will be conceptualized as the discrepancy
between actual and just wages (see section 3). The total amount of desired redistribution in occupational wages
would be given by comparing actual gross wages to desired net wages (i.e. wages after taxes and transfers).
However, because I can only compare wages before taxes and transfers, I can only measure redistribution on
top of the redistribution already implemented through the current system of taxes and transfers.
11Importantly, note that I am not concerned with factual wages in this paper and that individuals’ estimates
of actual occupational wages need not necessarily coincide with true occupational wages. Interestingly, however,
Stamm et al. (2003, p.166) note that average wage estimates and factual wages are surprisingly close. For
example, average monthly wages of a salesperson and a skilled factory worker equal 3,030 CHF and 4,660 CHF,
respectively (according to the Swiss Labor Force Survey of the years 1998/99). Note how close these numbers
are to the corresponding numbers reported in table A.1 (about 3,000 CHF and 4,200 CHF, respectively).
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company).12 Interestingly, the ranking with respect to ethical wage estimates is almost the
same as the ranking with respect to actual wages. Indeed, most individuals seem to accept
quite large differentials in pay between different occupations.13
Furthermore, actual and ethical wage estimates differ within each occupation, but the sign
and the size of this difference varies considerably across occupations. The overall picture
suggests, however, that people desire a substantial equalization of wages across occupations
on average, by simultaneously pushing up bottom wages and pulling down top wages. As
a consequence, there are two distinct groups of occupations (neglecting coworkers’ wages).
The three blue-collar occupations (i.e. shop assistant, unskilled worker, and skilled worker)
are characterized by relatively low actual wage estimates and by the fact that ethical wage
estimates are higher than actual wage estimates, while the reverse holds true for the remaining
six white-collar occupations.
3. Subjective inequality measures
In the following, I will use these wage estimates to construct subjective measures of inequality in
market wages, building on a simple analogy with the measurement of objective wage inequality
(i.e. the measurement of inequality based on factual wage data). First note that, in principle,
we only need to observe the underlying distribution of wages to measure objective inequality
because most inequality measures, like Gini’s inequality index, are solely a function of the
distribution of individual-level wages (e.g. Bojer, 2003; Lambert, 2001).
In the following, it will be most useful to focus directly on the case where occupation-
specific wages, instead of individual-level wages, are observed. Formally, assume that the
following vector of data is observed
{(y1, f1), . . . , (yj , fj), . . . , (yk, fk)} , (1)
with j = 1, . . . , k indexing the universe of occupations, yj denoting average occupation-specific
12This roughly corresponds to a range of wages from 2,600 USD (shop assistant) to 27,500 USD (owner-
manager of a large national company), based on the exchange rate of 1 CHF = 0.86 USD (May 4, 2011).
13Note that this also implies that absolute equality with respect to market wages (i.e. identical wages for all
occupations) is not judged as a fair distribution. In fact, focusing on those individuals who gave estimates for
all nine occupations, only two of them gave exactly the same wage estimate for all nine occupations.
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wages, and fj denoting the population weight of occupation j.
14 It is well known that group-
level data on wages can be used to approximate individual-level wage inequality (Gastwirth
and Glauberman, 1976). Specifically, I will approximate the distribution of individual-level
wages using the distribution of occupation-specific wages, in which case I also need to know
the distribution of individuals across occupations (see also appendix B).15
Next, note that it is only a small step from here to a simple conceptualization of the
measurement of subjective inequality because measuring wage inequality from an individual’s
point of view is in principle a simple generalization of the measurement of objective inequality.
The only difference is that we focus on individuals’ subjective estimates of occupation-specific
wages instead of factual wages. Formally, the distribution of wages across occupations becomes
an individual-specific quantity because different individuals may have different evaluations of
occupation-level wages
{(ŷ(i)1, f1), . . . , (ŷ(i)j , fj), . . . , (ŷ(i)k, fk)} , (2)
and subjective inequality measures may therefore also differ between individuals. Note that
the population weights are treated as fixed parameters, which allows me to focus exclusively on
differences between individuals with respect to their evaluation of occupation-specific wages.16
But as soon as we talk about subjective wage estimates, it becomes clear that we must
be more specific about what we actually mean by them. I thus now introduce the conceptual
distinction between the level of wage inequality that individuals perceive to exist and the level
of inequality that they judge as ethically tolerable.17 Thus there are, for each individual, two
14Note that
∑k
j=1 fj = 1 because it is assumed that j indexes the universe of occupations and that therefore
the universe of wage earners is represented in (1).
15The approximation is the better, the larger the number of distinct occupations and the smaller the variation
in wages within occupations. If there is no within-group variation at all, one can perfectly estimate the individual-
level wage distribution using group-level data, even if the number of occupations is smaller than the number of
individual observations. If there is some variation within groups, the Gini coefficient based on occupation-level
data will underestimate the true Gini coefficient based on individual-level data (see, inter alia, Kakwani and
Podder, 1973).
16Treating the population weights as fixed parameters may also be understood as requiring an individual to
estimate the wages for the exact same set of occupations. From this perspective, fixing the population weights
across individuals seems natural, even though individuals may have different perceptions of the distribution of
workers across different occupations.
17Note again that both of these subjective wage estimates may differ from factual wages for any occupation;
see also footnote 11.
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potentially different wage estimates for each occupation
{
(ŷ(i)w1 , f1), . . . , (ŷ(i)
w
j , fj), . . . , (ŷ(i)
w
k , fk)
}
, (3)
where superscript w introduces the distinction between individuals’ perception of actual wages
(w = actual) and their normative assessment of ethical wages (w = ethical), respectively.
There are three noteworthy points. First, subjective wage inequality can differ across individ-
uals because they can have different subjective evaluations of specific occupation-level wages.
Second, while one single inequality measure can summarize objective wage inequality, this will
usually not be possible for subjective inequality. In this case, inequality will usually be de-
scribed by a whole distribution of inequality measures across individuals. Finally, the same
individual may have very different actual and ethical wage estimates for any specific occupa-
tion. For example, an individual may have a much larger ethical than actual wage estimate
for an unskilled worker, implying that he or she thinks that people working in this occupation
are underpaid from his or her subjective point of view.
Unfortunately, subjective wage estimates on such a detailed occupation level as presumed
above are not available. However, one can always try to approximate the vector of occupation-
level wages using data at a broader level of aggregation. In the most simple case, there are
only two distinct groups of wage earners representing the bottom and the top of the wage
distribution (i.e. a bottom and a top group), and the resulting distribution of grouped wage
data can be fully characterized by three statistical moments, as detailed in appendix B. In
the case of subjective wage data, both the distribution of actual and of ethical wages can be
described by such a triple of moments:
(
ŷ(i)actualbottom, ŷ(i)
actual
top , fbottom
)
(4a)(
ŷ(i)ethicalbottom, ŷ(i)
ethical
top , fbottom
)
(4b)
Let ŷ(i)wbottom and ŷ(i)
w
top denote individual i’s wage estimate for the bottom and the top part
of the overall wage distribution, respectively, and let fbottom denote the population share of the
bottom group. The information contained in (4a) is thus used to approximate an individual’s
perceived distribution of actual wages, while (4b) is used to approximate his or her evaluation
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of how the ethical distribution of market wages should look like.
I use individuals’ estimates of occupation-specific wages to compute the two wage com-
ponents of (4a) and (4b), respectively. More specifically, ŷ(i)bottom is computed as the simple
average of an individual’s wage estimates of the three blue-collar occupations (i.e. shop assis-
tant, unskilled worker, skilled worker). Analogously, ŷ(i)top is computed as the simple average
of an individual’s wage estimates for the remaining six white-collar occupations (see figure 1
and appendix A).18 Finally, the fraction of individuals belonging to the bottom group, fbottom, is
estimated from the actual distribution of individuals across occupations in the sample amounts
to about 0.77.19 Because fbottom does not vary between individuals, it does not affect individu-
als’ ranking with respect to subjective inequality measures and thus effectively has no impact
on the qualitative pattern of results.
Clearly, working with only two distinct groups is a simplification. However, a more disag-
gregated analysis at this stage is limited by the fact that there are only nine different wage
estimates (i.e. those given in figure 1) available to construct the corresponding group-specific
wages.20 Because more elaborate measurements yield very similar subjective inequality mea-
sures, and because some additional observations are lost when using more than two groups, I
focus on the setting using two different groups of wage earners in the following.21
18One advantage from aggregating wage estimates over different occupations is that the problem of missing
data can be mitigated to some extent, as averaging over several occupations allows me to compute subjective
inequality measures as long as an individual gave at least one wage estimate for each of the two groups of
occupations.
19Specifically, the distribution of occupations in the sample is given by the International Standard Classifica-
tion of Occupations (ISCO). Based on this variable, I estimate fbottom as fbottom = n
−1∑n
i=1 1(ISCOi ∈ [3, 9]),
the fraction of individuals neither belonging to the group of “legislators, senior officials and managers” nor to
the group of “professionals” (these two groups in turn define the top group of occupations).
20Moreover, four of these nine wage estimates refer to the same, and rather narrow (only about 6% of the
sample belong to this group of occupations) group of occupations best described as “legislators, senior officials
and managers” (i.e. occupations with major ISCO code equal to 1). Similarly, both “unskilled worker” and
“shop assistant” belong to the heterogeneous group of lower skilled occupations.
21One feasible alternative uses three groups of wage earners, distinguishing major ISCO codes 1, 2, and 3-9. In
this case I estimate the wage of the first group (representing major ISCO code 1, “legislators, senior officials, and
managers”) using the average of the wage estimates of a minister, a judge, a chairman, and a manager/owner of
a factory and the wage of the second group (representing major ISCO code 2, “professionals”) using the average
of the wage estimates of a doctor and a lawyer. It is also possible to distinguish between major ISCO codes 1,
2, 3 and 4-9. In this case I estimate the wage of the first two groups as detailed above; the wage of the third
group (representing major ISCO code 3) is estimated using the wage estimate of a skilled worker; the wage of
the fourth group (representing major ISCO codes 4 to 9) is estimated using the average of the wage estimates
of a shop assistant and an unskilled worker. It turns out that the resulting inequality measures are virtually
identical: the correlation between the two measures of actual inequality, ethical inequality, and the assessment
of market justice based on two versus three groups equals 0.979, 0.980, and 0.978, respectively. Similarly, the
correlation coefficient between the measures of actual inequality, ethical inequality, and the assessment of market
justice based on two versus four groups of wage earners are equal to 0.9702, 0.9900, and 0.9764, respectively.
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Given estimates of all components of (4a) and (4b), constructing the individual-level in-
equality measures is straightforward. The result from appendix B implies that the two sub-
jective inequality measures (i.e. Gini coefficients for actual and ethical wage distribution) are
given by the following simple expressions:
G(i)actual = fbottom − q(i)actualbottom, and (5a)
G(i)ethical = fbottom − q(i)ethicalbottom, (5b)
with q(i)wbottom denoting the wage share of the bottom group:
22
q(i)wbottom = (ŷ(i)
w
bottom · fbottom)/ŷ(i)w for w = {actual, ethical} (6)
As before, (5a) refers to an individual’s actual wage estimates and (5b) to his or her ethical
wage estimates, respectively. The individual-level Gini coefficient is thus simply given by the
difference in the population share of the bottom group and the estimated wage share of the
bottom group.23 Because I treat the size of the two groups as the same for the actual and the
ethical wage distribution and as the same across individuals, all differences in G(i)w between
individuals must be driven by differences in individuals’ subjective wage estimates for the two
groups.24
Using the discrepancy between an individual’s actual and ethical wage inequality as an
empirical measure of his or her normative assessment of market justice also appears natural.
In the empirical analysis below, I will focus on the relative difference in the two inequality
indices
R(i) =
[
1−
(
G(i)ethical
G(i)actual
)]
, (7)
which measures the degree to which an individual wants to decrease or increase the level
22Note that an individual’s overall wage estimate is given by a weighted average of the wage of the bottom
group and of the top group, i.e. ŷ(i)w = ŷ(i)wbottom · fbottom + ŷ(i)wtop · (1− fbottom).
23Note that G(i)w could in principle be negative if the estimated wage share of the bottom group is larger than
the corresponding population share (a case not ruled out a priori). However, there is only one single individual
in the sample with a negative value on ethical inequality in market wages.
24One can imagine that individuals also would ideally prefer a distribution of occupations different from that
they actually perceive to exist. Unfortunately, however, there are no corresponding questions in the survey that
would make an analysis of desired changes in the distribution of occupations feasible.
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of inequality in market wages (as a percentage of the actual level of inequality). Note that
R(i) relates to desired changes in market wages because both actual and ethical wages are
measured before taxes and transfer payments. The measure may therefore also be thought
of as an indicator of an individual’s normative assessment of market injustice, or rather as
the absence of market justice, as high values of R(i) imply a high demand for equalization
of market wages between different occupations. Importantly, the measure fits the intuition
that the assessment of market injustice is high when there is a large discrepancy between an
individual’s actual and ethical assessment of wage inequality. Analogously, there is no feeling
of market injustice if there is no discrepancy between actual and ethical inequality in market
wages, no matter how high or low the actual level of inequality is.
The obvious downside of this measure is that it neither tells us anything about the de-
sired redistribution from the economically active part of the population to the inactive part
(e.g. unemployed workers, retirees) nor about redistribution through the provision of public
goods, most notably through education. This measure has a much more precise meaning than
conventional measures of preferences over redistribution, however, which are usually given by
individuals’ agreement with some rather vague statement that inequality is too high.
3.1. Descriptive statistics
Not surprisingly, table 1 shows that ethical wage estimates for the bottom group are higher on
average than actual wage estimates (average actual wage estimates equal about 3,450 CHF,
while ethical wages are about 4,280 CHF). At the same time, however, people would like to
decrease wages of the top group, i.e. ethical wages are lower than actual wages for the top
end of the overall wage distribution (actual wages of about 22,630 CHF versus ethical wages
of about 16,750 CHF). Consequently, the ethical distribution of market wages looks different
from the actual distribution of market wages for most individuals. Indeed, panel (c) of table
1 shows that the average actual inequality amounts to about 0.41, while the average ethical
wage inequality only equals about 0.29. The table further shows that only a negligible fraction
of individuals favors absolute equality of wages (actually only one individual), and that not a
single individual perceives no wage inequality at all.
Table 1
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Panel (a) of figure 2 shows the joint distribution of the two subjective inequality measures.
Clearly, most individuals desire a lower level of wage inequality than what they actually perceive
to exist, as most individuals are situated below the 45◦ line. The figure also shows that people
not only hold widely different beliefs about what what is judged as a fair distribution of wages
across occupations, but that they also have markedly different perceptions of reality. Also, there
is considerable variation in normative beliefs for any given level of perceived wage inequality,
and vice versa. Panel (c) of table 1 shows that the average desired equalization of market
wages equals about 0.31, which implies that the average individual would like to decrease
inequality in market wages across occupations by about a third, relative to the perceived level
of inequality.
Figure 2
As a consequence, most individuals have some positive demand for equalization of market
wages, as shown in panel (c) of table 1. Thus most people would favor a more equal distribution
of market wages, relative to the distribution of market wages they actually perceive, as shown
in panel (b) figure 2.25 Furthermore, there is a remarkable skew in the distribution towards zero
implying that, even though a majority of individuals desires a reduction in inequality, most of
the people desire rather small changes in market wages only. A final remarkable feature is that
even though most individuals would like to change the distribution of market wages, overall
actual wage estimates are on average very similar to overall ethical wage estimates. This is
evident from the comparison of actual overall wage estimates to ethical overall wage estimates
(see last row of panel (a) and (b), respectively). The actual overall wage estimate is 7,829
CHF, very close to the ethical overall wage estimate of 7,126 CHF. It thus seems that people
are somehow aware that increasing wages at the bottom of the distribution must be offset by
countervailing decreases at the top end of the wage distribution.
25Figure 2 also shows that, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, there are some individuals for whom the ethical
wage inequality is higher than actual wage inequality, resulting in a negative demand for wage equalization.
Further scrutiny of these few observations shows, however, that the reason for their negative demand for equal-
ization is not that they want to redistribute from the bottom to the top. Instead, these individuals not only
want to increase the wage of the bottom group, but also that of the top group, and the desired increase for the
top group is higher than that of the bottom group. Also note that only a tiny fraction of all individuals would
either like to eliminate all existing wage inequalities or to implement no change in the wage distribution at all
(see table 1).
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4. Results
This section presents two distinct sets of empirical results. The first documents the links
between individuals’ attitudes towards inequality, their self-interest in redistribution, and the
different subjective inequality measures. Besides being of interest on their own, these results
will also facilitate the comparison to existing evidence. The second set of results provides
evidence on the hypothesized link between subjective inequality measures and the assessment
of market justice on the one hand and individuals’ propensity to support redistributive policies
and their support for those political parties implementing such policies in the end on the other
hand.
4.1. The assessment of market justice
I first present a simple statistical model for the observed variation in individuals’ normative
assessment of market justice. I follow the previous literature and focus primarily on deter-
minants that relate to perceptions of actual determinants and normative beliefs about just
determinants of pay on the one hand and self-interested motives on the other hand (see Fong
et al., 2005, for a recent overview). Specifically, I run several simple linear regression models
of the following form to empirically assess the importance of different factors in explaining the
demand for equalization of market wages:
mi = α+ beliefsiγ1 + interestiγ2 + controlsiβ + i, (8)
where mi denotes either an individual’s assessment of actual or ethical wage inequality (that is,
either G(i)actual or G(i)ethical) or, alternatively, an individual’s normative assessment of market
justice, i.e. his or her desired degree of equalization of market wages across different occupations
(i.e. R(i)).
The first two vectors of regressors, beliefsi and interesti, refer to individuals’ beliefs and
perceptions with respect to distributional issues and to variables describing individuals’ self-
interested motives for redistribution, respectively. More specifically, I include the following
four variables which relate to the factors that people think are (or ought to be) important in
determining individuals’ pay: the belief that luck and effort should be important on the one
hand, and the perception that ascribed and acquired skills are important on the other hand.
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The first two of these variables refer to individuals’ normative beliefs about factors that should
be important from their points of view; the latter two describe individuals’ perceptions of the
factual determinants of pay differentials. I further include an individual’s income (Meltzer
and Richard, 1981), his or her evaluation of whether he or she believes that his or her pay
is appropriate (Clark and Oswald, 1996; Luttmer, 2005), and an index of experienced social
mobility (Piketty, 1995) as measures of self-interested motives for demanding redistribution.
The third vector (controlsi) denotes additional control variables.
26 The inclusion of these
additional control variables is meant to mitigate confounding by unobserved factors such as
risk aversion (e.g. Carlsson et al., 2005). The main parameters of interest are γ1 and γ2, and
the resulting estimates are given in table 2.
Table 2
The first two columns show estimates for the distribution of actual inequality. The first
column includes individuals’ perceptions and beliefs as well as self-interested motives as regres-
sors, the second column includes additional control variables (see footnote 26). The first thing
to note is that most coefficients are not statistically different from zero (even though most
estimates have the expected sign), with the exception of the two variables describing people’s
perceptions of whether ascribed and acquired skills are actually important in determining dif-
ferences in pay (personal income is only significant if additional controls are left out of the
model). However, the quantitative effects of these two variables are rather small. An increase
in the perception that ascribed skills determine income by one standard deviation (which is
equal to about 0.758 units of the corresponding variable, as shown in table A.2) implies a hy-
pothetical increase in actual inequality by about 0.009. This corresponds to a relative increase
of about 2.2%, if evaluated at the mean of the dependent variable (= 0.012 · 0.758/0.408). A
similar reasoning shows that a one standard deviation increase in the perception that acquired
skills are important in determining pay leads to a relative decrease in actual inequality of about
2.4% (i.e. 100%(−0.016 · 0.609)/0.408 = −2.4%).
26The full list of additional control variables is as follows: age in years (and its square), education (highest
attained level, in years), a female dummy, a dummy indicating foreign citizenship, a dummy indicating residence
in the German-speaking part of Switzerland, a dummy for residency in an urban area, two dummy variables
indicating unemployment and non-employment (employment is the reference category), a scale measuring in-
dividuals’ perception of conflicts, an occupational prestige scale, and individuals’ political self-assessment on a
simple left-right scale. The definitions of these variables are given in appendix A.
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The next two columns show analogous estimates for ethical inequality in market wages. In
this case, the two variables describing the factors that ought to determine pay are statistically
different from zero, and they both have quite a substantial association with ethical inequality.
An increase in the belief that needs should be important in determining pay is associated with
a relative decrease in ethical inequality of about 5% (= (−0.014 · 1.011)/0.285). Similarly, a
hypothetical increase in the belief that personal effort should determine income is associated
with an increase in ethical wage inequality of about 5.8% (= (0.024·0.45)/0.285). In contrast to
actual inequality, self-interested motives (i.e. personal income and income dissatisfaction) are
also associated with the assessment of ethical inequality in a statistically significant manner.
Note further that the goodness-of-fit for ethical inequality is about twice as large as for actual
inequality, suggesting that perceptions are much more idiosyncratic than ethical beliefs.
The last two columns show regression models for the desired equalization of market wages.
All regressors have the expected sign: people who think that effort and acquired skills are
(or should be) important tend to have a lower demand for equalization of market wages,
while individuals who believe that one’s needs do (or should) determine pay tend to have a
higher demand. More importantly, however, note that the estimated effects are quite large
in substantive terms. For example, an increase in the belief that effort should be important
in determining one’s pay by one standard deviation (which is equal to about 0.45 units of
the corresponding variable) implies a hypothetical decrease in the demand for equalization of
wages of -0.033, or a relative decrease of almost 11% (if evaluated at the mean of the dependent
variable, which equals 0.304). The belief that needs should be important in determining pay
has an effect of about equal size but opposite sign: a one standard deviation increase in this
variable implies an increase in the demand for equalization of market wages of about 0.025
(or about 8%). Analogously, the relative effects of changing the perception that ascribed and
acquired skills are important in determining pay (by one standard deviation) amount to 4% and
-5.2%, respectively. Self-interested motives also have the expected sign. Personal income has a
significant and large negative effect on the demand for wage equalization. The model in column
5 yields a semi-elasticity of the demand for equalization of market wages with respect to income
of about -0.04. Thus doubling an individual’s income would imply a decrease in the demand for
equalization by more than 10%, if evaluated at the mean of the dependent variable.27 Probably
27Nonetheless, even the richest individuals in the sample have a positive demand for equalization of market
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more surprising, there is also a large and statistically significant effect stemming from income
dissatisfaction on the demand for equalization of market wages. Individuals who think that
they are not paid enough themselves have a much higher demand for equalization, even holding
their absolute level of income constant. On the other hand, the mobility index turns out to have
a very small effect in both economic and statistical terms. The model shown in the last column
again includes additional control variables. This does not change the qualitative pattern of the
results, which in turn implies that the correlation between the different sets of regressors is not
very pronounced. However, the additional control variables have some explanatory power, as
shown by a comparison of the adjusted R-squared for the model in the second to last column
(about 9.2%) to the model in the last columns (about 14.3%).
The overall pattern of these results is very similar to previous evidence, showing that
self-interested motives as well as perceptions and normative beliefs are important in explaining
observed differences in the desire to equalize market wages. However, the conceptual distinction
between actual and ethical inequality adds some interesting insights. First, differences in the
perception of actual inequality are surprisingly large, even though not as large as differences in
the evaluation of ethical inequality. Second, and quite intuitively, there is more idiosyncratic
variation in the evaluation of actual inequality than in the case of ethical wage inequality (note
that the R-squared in the case of actual inequality is only about half as large as for ethical
inequality). Finally, the fact that the included regressors have very different associations with
the two inequality indices suggests that actual and ethical inequality indeed are cognitively
distinct concepts.
4.2. Support for redistribution by the state
Given that the actual amount of redistribution is ultimately the outcome of a political process,
studying whether individuals’ propensity to support redistribution by the state is related to
their assessment of market justice may yield evidence on the hypothesized association between
individuals’ preferences and factual political outcomes.
To do so, I use a simple survey measure which ranges from 1 to 5, with 5 denoting the
highest level of support for redistribution by the state (see appendix A).28 I then regress this
wages. This is evident from an unconditional analysis of the data, showing that almost all individuals have a
positive demand for equalization of market wages (see figure 2 again).
28Regressions using a dichotomized measure denoting any positive support for redistribution by the state
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measure on either the demand for wage equalization or on the two inequality indices along
with some additional control variables
supporti = α+miζ + interestiγ1 + beliefsiγ2 + controlsiβ + i, (9)
where mi denotes the inclusion of either the demand for equalization of market wages or the two
subjective wage inequality measures as key regressor(s). The three vectors of control variables
are the same as in the analysis before. Results are shown in table 3.
Table 3
The key regressor in the first two columns is the demand for equalization of market wages.
Because the previous analysis has shown that this measure is strongly associated with individ-
uals’ perceptions and beliefs and as well as with self-interested motives, I show both estimates
including and omitting these variables as regressors. In both cases, the assessment of market
injustice has a positive and statistically significant effect on the support for the welfare state
in all models, whether individuals’ beliefs or self-interest motives are included as regressors or
not and, as before, the estimated effect turns out to be large: increasing the demand for wage
equalization by 0.198 (which corresponds to one standard deviation of the regressor) yields a
predicted increase in the dependent variable of about 0.25 (= 1.277 · 0.198), which is about a
fourth of the standard deviation of the dependent variable. Evaluated at the mean of the depen-
dent variable, this corresponds to a relative effect of about 8% (= 100%[(0.198 ·1.277)/3.186]).
As expected, the second column shows that the inclusion of additional regressors leads to a
somewhat smaller coefficient, but the effect nonetheless remains large in both substantive and
statistical terms.
In the remaining two columns of table 3, the two subjective inequality measures are included
as key regressors (instead of the demand for equalization of market wages). Again, both
variables turn out to have large and significant effects on individuals’ support for redistribution
by the state; controlling for additional variables does not make much of a difference. I therefore
focus on the results in the final column. First, hypothetically increasing actual inequality by
one standard deviation (i.e. about 0.95) leads to a predicted increase in the support for
yield qualitatively similar results (results not shown).
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redistribution by the state of almost 0.1, or about one standard deviation of the dependent
variable. The estimates imply that the elasticity of the support for redistribution by the
state with respect to actual inequality is about 0.4 (= (0.4 · 3.345)/3.186). Similarly, the
elasticity of market injustice with respect to the ethical inequality index is about -0.25 (=
(0.285 · −2.796)/3.186).
Overall, the results suggest that individuals who have a high demand for equalization
of market wages, which may arise either because they perceive that there is a high level
of occupational wage inequality or because they think that only a low level of inequality is
normatively acceptable, have a significantly higher propensity to be supportive of redistribution
by the state. This in turn is likely to imply that these individuals are also more supportive
of a system of taxes and transfer payments that explicitly aims at reducing the dispersion in
market wages. One would thus probably expect these individuals to differ with respect to
their party preferences as well, assuming that the parties compete against another for votes by
offering different redistributive policies.
4.3. Party identification
Thus I next turn to the association between individuals’ stated preferences over political parties
and the different measures of subjective inequality. To do so, I estimate some simple regression
models in which individuals’ stated preference for some political party is the dependent variable.
Specifically, I model the probability that an individual states preference for some specific
political party j,
Pr(Partyi = j|mi, beliefsi, interesti, controlsi), (10)
using a multinomial logit model for j = 0, 1, . . . , 5.29 As above, mi denotes the inclusion of
either the demand for equalization of market wages or the two subjective inequality measures
as key regressor(s), and beliefsi, interesti and controlsi are the same sets of control variables as
29 I only consider the five largest (with respect to actual voting shares) parties in Switzerland, denoted
by j = 1, 2, . . . , 5 (preference for any other or no party at all is denoted by j = 0). These are the Liberal
Party (“FDP Die Liberalen”), the Christian Democrats (CVP, “Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei”), the
right-of-center Swiss People’s Party (SVP, “Schweizerische Volkspartei”), the Social-democratic Party (SPS,
“Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz”), and the Green Party (GPS, “Gru¨ne Partei der Schweiz”). The
Swiss Federal Council, the executive council at the national level, consists of members of the first four parties
mentioned (see also Hug and Schulz, 2007).
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in the models shown before. The parameter of main interest in the case is the average partial
effect of mi on stated party preference, summarizing the effect of the subjective inequality
measure on the stated party preference. However, the preceding section has shown the various
moments describing subjective evaluations of the wage distribution are clearly correlated with
at least some of the control variables. As before, I therefore run the same set of regressions on
a restricted set of control variables also (i.e. only including socio-economic controls).
Table 4
The top panel of table 4 shows average partial effects when using the restricted set of control
variables only, while the bottom panel includes the full set of regressors. First note that the
difference in the results between the top and the bottom panel is as expected, in that in the
models with the full set of control variables a significant part of the effect of Ri (G
w
i ) on party
preference is absorbed by the controls. More importantly, all point estimates have the expected
sign. The assessment of market injustice has a negative effect on the probability of stating
preference for the Liberal Party (FDP), but a positive effect on stating preference for one of the
two left-of-center parties (SPS and GPS). Interestingly, the amount of desired redistribution
also has a positive effect on stating preference for the right-of-center Swiss People’s Party
(SVP) and the size of the effect is essentially the same as the effect for stating preference for
the left. The only party for which there is no effect at all is Christian-Democratic party (i.e. the
point estimate is essentially zero). Also note though that only the effect on stating preference
for the Liberal Party (FDP) reaches statistical significance at any conventional level.
Again, the size of the estimated effects is quite large. For example, a hypothetical increase
in the demand for wage equalization by one sample standard deviation (which is equal to about
0.2) would lower the probability of favoring of the FDP by about 7% (= −0.346 · 0.2 · 100%).
Taking the mean of the dependent variable into account and re-expressing the effect as an
elasticity, it appears even larger: Evaluated at the sample mean of the demand for equalization
(' 0.3), the estimated elasticity of the probability of casting a vote in favor of the FDP with
respect to the dependent variable equals about -0.75 (= (0.3 · −0.346)/0.139).
The same qualitative pattern of results is evident if the two subjective inequality measures
are used as regressors (instead of the single measure of market justice). Again, there are
no statistically significant effects regarding the preference for the Christian-Democratic party
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whatsoever, but at least one of the two subjective inequality measures has an effect statistically
different from zero for all of the other parties. First, identification with the FDP is significantly
shaped by both the perceived and the desired level of wage inequality. That is, individuals
who perceive wage inequality to be low, and/or whose desired wage inequality is high have
a higher probability of stating preference for the FDP. In the case of the three remaining
political parties (SVP, SPS, and GPS), the reverse pattern holds, i.e. people with a high level
of perceived occupational wage inequality and/or a low level of ethical inequality tend to state
preference for one of these three parties. Again, the effects turn out to be large. Considering
the effects on the probability of being in favor of the FDP shows that an increase in the
perceived wage inequality by one sample standard deviation (about 0.41) and an increase in
the ethical wage inequality by one standard deviation (about 0.29) imply a decrease (increase)
in the probability of being in favor of the FDP by about 31% (= −0.770 ·0.41 ·100%) and 21%
(= 0.728 · 0.29 · 100%), respectively. Also, the bottom panel again shows that the inclusion of
more control variables does not change the relevant point estimates by much.
Even though the results do not fit a simple left-right pattern, they are perfectly consistent
with effective election results in Switzerland. Besides the rather obvious negative effect on
identification with the Liberal Party and the positive effect on identification with the Social-
democratic Party, the results also coincide with what is known about the more peculiar com-
position of the electorate of the Swiss People’s Party (McGann and Kitschelt, 2005). The
apparently surprising result that a high demand for wage equalization is associated with stat-
ing preference for the far-right is actually well in line with what is known about the electorate
of this party. Most importantly, the party succeeded in attracting a substantial fraction of
blue-collar workers who tend to be in favor of redistributive policies (e.g. Oesch, 2008).
5. Conclusions
A simple conceptual framework based on individuals’ subjective estimates of occupation-
specific wages appears to be a fruitful approach for describing individuals’ subjective eval-
uations of wage inequality and their demand for equalization of market wages. Because the
framework explicitly differentiates between individuals’ perceptions of actual wages and their
normative evaluations of ethical wages, it leads to a simple measure for the demand for wage
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equalization as the discrepancy between an individual’s assessment of the perceived and the
desired level of inequality. Not surprisingly, there is considerable variation both in the actual
and the ethical level of inequality in market wages. Nonetheless, there is strong support for
some equalization of wages across occupations for virtually all individuals and it thus turns
out that most individuals indeed demand a strictly more equal distribution of market wages.
In most cases, a positive demand for wage equalization is a combination of a desire to increase
wages at the bottom and to decrease wages at the top of the distribution, which also reflects
a discrepancy between the perceived and the desired distribution of occupational wages. At
the same time, most individuals accept quite large wage differences between occupations. This
also suggests that, for most people, absolute equality is not the reference distribution to which
the actual distribution of wages is compared to.
The empirical analysis further shows that not only individuals’ perceptions about the de-
terminants of pay and their normative beliefs over distributional issues, but also their self-
interested motives all explain some of the observed differences in the demand for equalization
of market wages. In line with the existing empirical evidence, I find that individuals’ personal
income is a remarkably weak predictor of the assessment of market injustice, given its promi-
nent role in the theoretical literature, and that norms and perceptions related to distributional
justice appear to have an impact on the demand for wage equalization that appears to be at
least as important. The key results of the study provide indirect evidence on the hypothe-
sized link between subjective inequality measures on the one hand and political outcomes on
the other hand. I find that the two subjective inequality indices as well as the normative as-
sessment of market justice have substantially large associations with individuals’ propensity to
support redistribution by the state as well as with their stated party preferences. This strongly
suggests that redistributive preferences indeed may filter through into political outcomes such
as the factual level of redistribution.
Finally, the framework proposed in this paper appears to be well suited for the empirical
description of individuals’ perceptions of wage inequality, of the distribution of wages that
individuals judge as a fair, as well as of their demand for equalization of market wages. There-
fore, applying the proposed framework to data from other countries and/or to other points in
time may provide interesting insights and foster our understanding of country-level differences
with respect to factual inequality as well as to differences in the effective size and impact of
22
redistributive policies.
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Figure 1: Individuals’ subjective wage estimates for different occupations
Notes: The hollow triangles correspond to the sample average of individuals’ actual wage estimates.
Analogously, the hollow circles denote sample averages of ethical wage wage estimates for the different
occupations. Occupations are ordered by average actual wage estimates. Net earnings corresponds to
earnings before taxes and transfer payments, but after the deduction of social security contributions
(1 CHF ' 0.86 USD). See notes of table A.1 and appendix A for additional explanations.
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Figure 2: Subjective inequality measures
Notes: Panel (a) shows the joint distribution of actual and ethical wage inequality. The dashed
line corresponds to the 45◦ line. Panel (b) shows the distribution of individuals’ assessment of
market justice. The dashed line shows the corresponding kernel density estimate (Gaussian kernel;
bandwidth of about 0.07). Variable definitions are given in the main text.
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Appendix A. Variable Definitions
A.1. Dependent Variables
Occupational Wage Estimates: Individuals were asked two questions about occupational wages
(the wording is taken from the original source questionnaire of the ISSP):
1. “We would like to know what you think people in these jobs actually earn. Please write
how much you think they actually earn each month (before taxes, but after social security
contributions). Many people are not exactly sure about this, but your best guess will be
close enough.”
2. Next, what do you think people in these jobs ought to be paid. How much do you think they
should earn each month (before taxes, but after social security contributions), regardless
of what they actually earn.”
Individuals were asked to estimate actual and just wages of people working in the following
ten jobs (in the same order as in the survey):
1. “A skilled worker in a factory” (skilled worker)
2. “A doctor in general practice” (doctor)
3. “The chairman of a large national company” (chairman)
4. “A lawyer” (lawyer)
5. “A shop assistant in a big store” (shop assistant)
6. “The owner-manager of a large national factory” (owner factory)
7. “A judge at the Federal Supreme Court” (judge)
8. “An unskilled worker in a factory” (unskilled worker)
9. “A member of the Swiss Federal Council” (minister)
10. “Your own occupation” (coworker)
The phrasing in parentheses denotes the label used in the main text, figures and tables. De-
scriptive statistics are given in table A.1.
Support for redistribution by the state: Individuals’ support for redistribution by the state
is measured by a simple item from the survey: “Do you agree or disagree? It is the responsi-
bility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes
and those with low incomes.” The possible answers range from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 5
(“strongly agree”). In the analysis I use a dichotomized variable taking on the value 1 if an
individual (strongly) agrees with the statement and 0 otherwise.
Stated party preference: Individuals were asked whether they feel affiliated with one of the
political parties in Switzerland (i.e. people were asked for which party they would vote if there
were any elections at the time of the interview). The five relevant parties at the time of the
interview were the following:
1. The Liberal Party (“Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei”, FDP); average score on a simple
left-right scale (on a scale from 0 to 10 with 10 denoting the rightmost position; see
below) of respondents in favor of this party is 5.91.
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2. The Christian-democratic Party (“Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei”, CVP); average
score is 4.94 (which is almost equal to the overall average of 4.78 across all parties).
3. The Swiss People’s Party (“Schweizerische Volkspartei”, SVP); average score on left-right
scale of 5.68.
4. The Social-democratic Party (“Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz”, SPS); average
score on left-right scale of 3.58.
5. The Green Party (“Gru¨ne Partei der Schweiz”, GPS); average score on left-right scale of
2.94.
With respect to vote shares, these were the largest five parties in Switzerland in the year the
survey was administered (1999). Members of the first four parties make up the Swiss Federal
Council (the executive council at the national level). See Hug and Schulz (2007) for more
information on the political parties in Switzerland.
A.2. Independent Variables
I use three sets of regressors in the empirical analysis: (i) variables describing the factors
that should or ought to determine actual pay from the individuals’ point of view, (ii) variables
describing individuals’ self-interest in redistribution, and (iii) additional control variables which
potentially correlate with unobserved determinants of subjective inequality measures (like risk
aversion, for example). Descriptive statistics are given in table A.2.
A.2.1. Factors that determine (or ought to determine) pay
Needs: This variable is meant to capture the extent to which an individual thinks that one’s
needs should be important in determining their income (need principle). This variable is
constructed from the following two questions about the factors that should be important in
determining one’s pay: “In deciding how much people ought to earn, how important should each
of these things be, in your opinion? (i) What is needed to support your family. (ii) Whether
the person has children to support.”
Effort: This variable is meant to capture the equity principle and is constructed from five
questions about which factors should be important in determining pay: “In deciding how
much people ought to earn, how important should each of these things be, in your opinion? (i)
How much responsibility goes with the job. (ii) The number of years spent in education and
training. (iii) Whether the job requires supervising others. (iv) How well he or she does the
job. (v) How hard he or she works at the job.”
Ascribed skills: This variable measures the extent to which a person beliefs in ascribed factors
as being important in determining the amount of compensation. This question relates to the
perception of individuals of which factors actually are important for getting ahead. “We have
some questions about opportunities for getting ahead: (i) How important is coming from a
wealthy family? (ii) Knowing the right people?”
Acquired skills: This variable measures if an individual thinks that acquired skills are actually
important in determining one’s pay. The variable is the sum of over two different questions:
“We have some questions about opportunities for getting ahead: (i) Do you agree or disagree?
In Switzerland, people get rewarded for their effort. (ii) In Switzerland, people get rewarded
for their intelligence and skills.”
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A.2.2. Self-interest in Redistribution
Income: An individual’s personal net monthly income (i.e. income before transfers and taxes,
but net of mandatory social security contrubutions).
Income dissatisfaction: This variable corresponds to the ratio of just to actual wage estimate
for individual i’s coworkers, that is (y(i)ethicalcoworker/y(i)
actual
coworker), with y(i)
actual
coworker and y(i)
ethical
coworker de-
noting individual i’s actual and ethical wage estimate for his or her coworkers, respectively.
Mobility: The only information about individuals’ mobility is contained in two questions about
their self-perception of the position today and the position ten years ago: “(i) In our society,
there are groups which tend to be towards the top and groups which tend to be toward the
bottom. Below is a scale that runs from top to bottom. Where would you put yourself on this
scale? (ii) And ten years ago, where did you fit then?” Both are measured on a scale from 1
(bottom) to 10 (top). The mobility scale used simply is defined as the difference between the
two scores (i.e. position today minus position ten years ago).
A.2.3. Additional Control Variables
Occupational prestige: This variable measures occupational prestige according to the Stan-
dard International Occupational Prestige Scale (SIOPS), based on the International Standard
Classification of Occupations.
Perception of Conflicts: This variable measures individuals’ perceptions of conflicts within
society. Included items are questions about the existence of conflicts between: “In all coun-
tries, there are differences or even conflicts between different social groups. In your opinion,
In Switzerland how much conflict is there between...: (i) Poor people and rich people? (ii) The
working class and the middle class? (iii) Management and workers? (iv) People at the top of
society and people at the bottom? (v) Young people and older people?”
Political scale: This variable measures individuals’ self-rated position on a scale that takes
on an integer value j ∈ {0, . . . , 10}, with 0 (10) indicating the leftmost (rightmost) position.
Socio-demographic controls: The remaining controls that are used in the analysis are self-
explanatory: Age (in years), education (highest attained education, in years), gender, citizen-
ship (dummy variable indicating Swiss citizenship), location of residence (dummy indicating
residence in the German-speaking part of Switzerland, dummy indicating residence in an urban
area), and employment status (dummy variables indicating employment, unemployment and
nonemployment, respectively).
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Table A.1: Individuals’ subjective wage estimates, by occupation
Actual wage Ethical wage
(a) Bottom group:
Shop assistant 3, 000.51 3, 976.14
(576.65) (750.47)
Unskilled worker 3, 115.14 3, 862.42
(606.94) (710.16)
Skilled worker 4, 230.29 4, 988.27
(840.81) (942.53)
(b) Top group:
Doctor 16, 544.88 13, 041.23
(9, 372.36) (7, 310.21)
Lawyer 18, 066.27 12, 825.34
(10, 713.63) (7, 632.34)
Federal judge 19, 458.89 15, 387.11
(9, 037.83) (8, 243.59)
Member of the Swiss Federal Council 23, 487.06 18, 404.38
(13, 339.75) (10, 802.50)
Chairman 24, 830.39 16, 391.90
(17, 073.77) (11, 449.99)
Owner of a factory 32, 556.93 24, 231.55
(21, 118.52) (16, 908.66)
(c) Respondent’s occupation
Coworker 6, 306.41 6, 770.15
(5, 680.46) (5, 140.40)
Notes: The table shows average estimates of actual and just net monthly wages in
CHF (i.e. wages net of mandatory social security contributions, but before taxes and
transfers; 1 CHF ' 0.86 USD)). Sample standard deviations are given in parentheses.
The number of observations varies somewhat between different cells because not all
individuals gave estimates for all occupations. The maximum number of observations
is 593, which corresponds to the sample used in the main part of the empirical
analysis.
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Table A.2: Summary statistics, control variables
Mean Standard deviation
(a) Beliefs and perceptions
Should be important: needs 3.247 (1.011)
Should be important: effort 3.817 (0.450)
Is important: ascribed skills 3.026 (0.758)
Is important: acquired skills 3.311 (0.609)
(b) Self-interested motives
ln(income) 8.336 (0.663)
Mobility 0.543 (1.620)
Wage dissatisfaction 1.130 (0.304)
(c) Additional control variables
Occupational prestige 46.626 (12.335)
Employed (yes = 1) 0.841 (0.366)
Unemployed (yes = 1) 0.022 (0.147)
Nonemployed (yes = 1) 0.137 (0.344)
Age (years) 43.411 (13.532)
Female (yes = 1) 0.413 (0.493)
Education (years) 13.413 (2.638)
Urban residence (yes = 1) 0.653 (0.477)
Living in German-speaking part (yes = 1) 0.728 (0.445)
Foreign citizenship (yes = 1) 0.148 (0.356)
Political self-assessement (0 = left, 10 = right) 4.789 (1.686)
Perception of conflicts 2.337 (0.482)
Numer of observations 593
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Appendix B. The Gini Coefficient with k = 2
Assume that we observe group-level data on wages:
{(y1, f1), . . . , (yj , fj), . . . , (yk, fk)} , (B.1)
with j = 1, . . . , k indexing groups of wage earners (ordered by their within-group average
wage). For example, as in the main text, j may index occupations.
Further, let fj denote the population weight of group j and let yj denote the average wage
of group j. For any such grouped data, the Gini coefficient G can be computed as follows:30
G =
 k∑
j=1
0.5 · (Fj−1 + Fj)qj
− 0.5
 /0.5 =
 k∑
j=1
(Fj−1 + Fj)qj
− 1, (B.2)
Fj denotes to the accumulated population share up to and including group j and qj represents
the wage share of group j. That is, qj = (fj · yj)/
∑k
j=1(fj · yj).
In the case of two distinct groups only the wage distribution can be fully described by the
following three moments:
{(y1, f1), (y2, f2)} = {(y1, f1), (y2, (1− f1))} , (B.3)
because f1 + f2 = 1. In this case, the computation of G therefore simplifies considerably.
Multiplying out equation (B.2) and using the notation that j = 1 = bottom and j = 2 = top
yields:
G = [(0 + Fbottom)qbottom + (Fbottom + Ftop)qtop]− 1
= [(0 + fbottom)qbottom + (fbottom + 1)qtop]− 1
= fbottom(qbottom + qtop) + qtop − 1
= fbottom − qbottom (B.4)
The first equality of equation (B.4) follows from the fact that F0 = 0, F1 = Fbottom = fbottom
(because F is a cumulative density function) and that F2 = Ftop = fbottom + ftop = 1 (because
there are two groups of wage earners only). The last equality follows from the fact that
(qbottom + qtop) = 1 and that therefore (qtop − 1) = −qbottom.
30This formula in turn reflects the geometric interpretation of the Gini coefficient: the Gini coefficient equals
the ratio of the area between the curve representing equal distribution of wages and the Lorenz curve to the area
under the curve representing equal distribution (which is equal to 0.5 by construction). In the case of grouped
data, the area above the Lorenz curve can be computed as the sum of trapezoids:
k∑
j=1
0.5 · (Fj−1 + Fj)qj
Subtracting 0.5 (which equals the area above the diagonal) and dividing by 0.5 (which equals the area below
the diagonal) therefore yields the formula for the Gini coefficient as given by equation (B.2).
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